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policies. We study the spatial determinants of waste recovery by using a dataset of 102 
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provinces to isolate the effects of waste recovery in one province on neighboring 
provinces. We find that provinces mimic their own neighbors’ in the separate collection 
of waste aimed at recycling and recovery, with this effect being fully guided by 
provinces where the president can run for re-election (consistent with the yardstick 
competition hypothesis) but only when waste management policies become politically 
salient, that is, after the transposition of the 2008 EU Waste Framework Directive. 
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The new Circular Economy Action Plan (EC, 2020), which is part of the European Green 
Deal strategy, describes the challenges surrounding and the necessary actions for achieving 
its ultimate objective regarding waste and material flow management, namely, reducing 
waste generation. The plan recognizes that ‘despite efforts at the EU and national levels, the 
amount of waste generated is not going down’. Annual waste generation from all economic 
activities in the EU amounts to 2.5 billion tons, or 5 tons per capita a year, and each citizen 
produces on average nearly half a ton of municipal waste. ‘The decoupling of waste 
generation from economic growth will require considerable effort across the whole value 
chain’. It also highlights that ‘EU waste laws have driven major improvements in waste 
management since the 1970s’, though ‘additional efforts are necessary to support the Member 
States in waste management. Half of them are at risk of noncompliance with the 2020 target 
to recycle 50% of municipal waste’. 
 
Thus, while the overall strategy is coherently moving towards waste reduction, for economic, 
social, and environmental motivations, the performance of recycling and recovery of waste 
(Kinnaman et al. 2014) is far from fully desirable. Part of the difficulty in homogenously 
reaching waste management targets is the intrinsic decentralization of policies in this realm, a 
typical element of ‘environmental federalism’, which also gives rise to spillovers between 
nearby areas. Along these lines, it is therefore relevant to study the spatial dimension of waste 
management performance and policies (Kinnaman, 2003, 2014; Kinnaman and Fullerton, 
2000), especially because they constitute the ‘transmission chain’ for waste reduction and 
circular economy developments. This is the issue that this paper addresses. More specifically, 
the objective of this paper is to seek answers to two questions. First, are local policy decisions 
regarding waste management spatially related, and second, if they are, are they determined by 
political interests, such as re-election concerns? 
 
There is a growing body of literature seeking to explain the determinants of waste 
management performance. Among others, D’Amato et al. (2015) examine the relationship 
between waste management and disposal performance and local crime diffusion in Italy. 
Mazzanti et al. (2011, 2012) explore the economic and policy determinants of waste disposal 
and waste generation, looking at the recycling performance among the relevant factors. 
Managi et al. (2014) focus on the role of subsidies to municipalities in Japan to support 
waste-related technologies. Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2009) point out the role of environmental 
political activism as a driver of waste policies at the local level. In a similar vein, there is a 
wide body of research addressing spatial interactions in fiscal policy decisions at the local 
level. On the one hand, empirical works including Bartolini and Santolin, 2012; Baicker, 
2005; Case et al., 1993; Costa et al., 2015; Figlio et al., 1999; Foucalut et al., 2008; Revelli, 
2002 and 2003, among others, aim to investigate the presence of strategic interactions in local 
expenditure. On the other hand, spatial effects in local taxes have been detected by Agrawal, 
2015; Baskaran, 2020; Delgado et al., 2015; Edmark and Agren, 2008; Parchet, 2019, 
Revelli, 2005; Rizzo, 2008; and 2010.7 
 
7 The existence of strategic interactions between local governments is theoretically explained by several models, 
e.g., yardstick competition, tax and welfare competition, spillover effects, political trends and, more recently, 
knowledge diffusion and social learning. The most common explanations are based on the yardstick competition 
hypothesis or beneficial spillovers. In the yardstick competition model, voters without complete information on 
the cost of public goods and services compare expenditures and taxes in their jurisdiction with those of nearby 
jurisdictions (Salomon, 1987), and hence, voters punish the incumbent politician if her tax rate decisions are not 
in line with those of their neighbors. As for spillovers, the expenditures and taxes in a given local jurisdiction 




While these works shed light on the determinants of waste management in the public policy 
setting, there are only a few works that have analyzed the geographical aspects, potential 
spillovers and political determinants of waste management performance all together (Costa, 
2016; Fu et al., 2018). 
 
We thus complement the existing literature on spatial interactions and environmental policies 
by employing a novel identification strategy and explicitly focusing on waste management. In 
particular, we use information on all Italian provinces over the period of 2001–2014 and 
exploit the exogenous variation in policy decisions on waste management due to the political 
cycle.8 Italian provinces are characterized by staggered election times, so from the province 
perspective, being surrounded by jurisdictions in different years of a political term can be 
considered as good as randomly assigned. We take advantage of this unique setting to show 
that provincial waste recycling is affected by the political cycle; then, we use the political 
cycles of neighboring provinces to induce exogenous variation in the neighbors’ recycling of 
waste. Following this approach, we document positive and sizable spatial effects; that is, we 
find evidence of positive horizontal interdependence in waste recovery across Italian 
provinces. We further investigate whether these results are affected by political determinants, 
and we show that spatial interactions are significant only when the incumbent president of the 
province can be re-elected, which is a finding that indicates that waste recycling performance 
is used in the electoral campaign to buy voters and thus supports the yardstick competition 
hypothesis. Moreover, it is very relevant to note that spatial interactions hold only after the 
implementation of the Waste Framework Directive (EC, 2008), which represents a very 
important milestone in the policy adoption decisions of provinces. Finally, when combining 
these two pieces of evidence, we find that political motivations explain these strategic 
interactions, but only when waste recycling policies have become more visible to citizens and 
therefore are at the heart of the policy agenda. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional and 
policy settings and outlines the research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and the 
identification strategy of the model. Section 4 comments on the set of empirical analyses and 
main outcomes, including robustness tests and heterogeneous effects. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional setting and research hypotheses 
 
The Italian Constitution provides four layers of territorial governments: regions, provinces, 
metropolitan cities and municipalities. In our work, we focus on provinces, which are 
ordinary administrative entities corresponding to the European NUTS-3 level. 
 
Having specified this, and with reference to the waste management sector, Legislative Decree 
152/2006 (Environmental Consolidation Act) splits the competencies between regions and 
provinces. Regions are responsible for the preparation, adoption and updating of the waste 
plan and waste management regulatory activities (art. 196), as well as for the development, 
approval and updating of plans for the remediation of polluted areas (art. 197). Provinces and 
 
residents in neighboring municipalities. See Ferraresi et al., (2018) for a comprehensive discussion of these 
models. 
8 The ultimate goal of EU policies is to decrease waste generation. The implementation of waste prevention 
strategies strongly relies on the performance of the crucial waste management strategies of separate collection of 
waste, recovery and recycling. 
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municipalities also participate in the definition of these plans. However, the specific task of 
provinces is the periodic control over all waste management, brokerage and trade activities 
(art. 197), and the control and verification of remedial interventions and the consequent 
monitoring thereof. Regions, moreover, often delegate to the provinces the task of developing 
provincial waste management plans relating to the management of urban and special waste, 
such as defining the objectives for the containment of waste production, waste recovery and 
the reduction of landfilling; defining a program for the reuse and recovery of urban waste; 
planning the separate collection of urban waste according to specific local situations; 
identifying the offer of recovery and disposal by the industrial system for urban and special 
waste; and identifying areas unsuitable for the location of urban and special waste recovery 
and disposal plants. Therefore, provinces can put effort into monitoring actions affecting the 
level of waste recycling when implementing regional waste plans and waste management 
regulatory activities. This has been especially true after the Waste Framework Directive (EC, 
2008), which, on the one hand, set new recycling and recovery targets and, on the other, 
required that EU Member States adopt waste prevention programs, namely, programs aimed 
at a reduction in the amount of waste generated. After this directive, waste recycling became 
much more important for policy programs, and politicians used the directive as a way to 
improve their visibility. 
 
Regarding the electoral systems, during the period from 2001-2014, citizens directly elected 
the president of the province, who is in charge of the executive branch together with a 
government body (Giunta). Voters are also entitled to vote for the Provincial Council 
(Consiglio Provinciale), which enjoys legislative power. Provincial elections are normally 
held every 5 years, but the timing is not the same for all provinces. The staggering of 
electoral dates is the result of local government officials resigning before the end of their 
term because they could not form a majority in the city council to support the local 
government or because of political scandals or judicial impeachment. It then follows that the 
large degree of discretion enjoyed by provinces in the control over all waste management, 
combined with the unique institutional and electoral setting within which these local 
governments operate, provides a suitable framework to test how – and to what extent – the 
strategic choice of waste management and recovery is spatially and politically affected. 
 
More specifically, the following hypotheses are empirically tested: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Given the geographical proximity and observability of waste management 
performance at the provincial level, public policy actions might present relevant spatial 
correlations/interactions due to mimicking behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Some relevant institutional and policy factors might explain the existence of 
spatial interactions. In detail, given the different incentives for politicians who run for re-
election and politicians who do not, mimicking behavior is enhanced when politicians run for 
re-election. Such an effect is expected to have become more marked after the introduction of 
the 2008 EU Waste Framework Directive, which has increased citizens’ attention to and 
awareness of waste recycling practices. In other words, since the adoption of the directive, 
politicians might have had an incentive to observe what their neighboring municipalities do 
to increase (or to not lose) political consensus and thus be re-elected (consistent with the 






3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Data 
Our dataset combines information from several sources. First, on the waste management side, 
provincial data on the separate collection of waste for recycling and recovery are used. These 
data, produced every year by the Italian Institute for Environmental Protection and Research 
(ISPRA), allowed us to build our main dependent variable: the (log) per capita waste 
recovery at the provincial level (per capita waste recovery), which measures separated 
collected waste performance, which is behind waste recovery, reuse and recycling. 
We also include, for robustness, a set of time-varying variables that characterize the 
province’s demographic and economic situation from the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT). 
We include the (log) population of the province (population) and the ratio between the 
population and the province’s area (population density) to control for possible agglomeration 
and scale effects (Mazzanti et al., 2008). Territories with greater economic well-being are 
more likely to apply more efficient, sustainable policies, including waste management 
policies (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). Hence, we control for some economic provincial 
characteristics (Johnstone and Labonne, 2004): the (log) gross domestic product (GDP) at 
current market prices per capita (per capita GDP), the difference between the value of output 
and the value of intermediate costs (value added) and the (log) ratio of the employed to the 
working age population (employment rate). Finally, tourists may have a lower propensity to 
separate waste, as they are not directly interested in the local environmental impact (Mateu-
Sbert et al., 2013); hence, we include the (log) per capita presence of tourism. 
As was already mentioned, provincial elections are normally held every 5 years, but the 
timing is not the same for all provinces. For the period 2001-2014, electoral data are were 
collected from the Italian Ministry of the Interior. Table A1 of the Online Appendix shows 
that provinces follow different election schedules. Specifically, more than half of the 
provinces in the sample had elections in 2004 (and subsequently in 2009). Of the remaining 
provinces, 19 voted in 2008, 14 in 2003, 12 in 2013 and 11 voted in 2011. In the remaining 
years, we register 10 or fewer provincial elections. Since the Italian provincial electoral 
system establishes a limit of no more than two consecutive terms for the office of president, 
we build a dummy variable, termlimit, that is equal to 1 if the president of the province 
cannot be re-elected and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, we obtain a balanced panel sample of 102 provinces, including 1,428 observations 
spanning from 2001–2014. The summary statistics for all of the variables used in the analysis 
are reported in Table A2 of the Online Appendix. 
 
3.2 Identification Strategy 
The classical model of spatial interactions can be written as follows: 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 = 𝛾
′𝑊𝑅𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑝𝑡 + 𝜇𝑝 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝𝑡       (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 is the log of per capita waste recovery (kg) in province p at time t, and 𝑊𝑅𝑝𝑡 =
∑ 𝜔𝑝𝑗𝑅𝑗𝑡𝑗≠𝑝  is the weighted (log of) per capita average waste recovery in the neighboring 
provinces j at time t; 𝜔𝑝𝑗 are all equal weights that aggregate the per capita waste recovery of 
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neighboring provinces into a single variable 𝑊𝑅𝑖𝑡 and are normalized so that ∑ 𝜔𝑝𝑗 = 1𝑗≠𝑝 .
9 
The vector 𝑋𝑝𝑡 includes the control variables described in Section 3.1, while 𝜇𝑝 and 𝜏𝑡 are 
provincial and year fixed effects, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
provincial level. 
The simultaneous determination of waste recovery makes the variable 𝑊𝑅𝑝𝑡 endogenous. To 
address this issue, we exploit the change in waste recovery due to the political cycle, 
motivated by the fact that the staggered timing of provincial elections generates a sort of 
random assignment of the political cycle of provinces, that is to say that the position in the 
term of a single province in a given year can be considered as good as randomly assigned 
(Ferraresi, 2020). It follows that if a strategic incentive to manipulate policy decisions, 
including the choice of promoting a waste recovery attitude, close to the time of elections 
held at the local level (i.e., a political budget cycle) is present, the timing of neighboring 
elections can be used as a way to induce exogenous variation in neighbors’ attitudes towards 
recycling. 
The key question is then whether the attitude of Italian provinces towards waste recovery is 
affected by the political budget cycle. The empirical evidence seems to support this 
hypothesis but limits the analysis to fiscal outcomes, as shown by Benito et al., 2017, who 
found the presence of an electoral budget cycle on waste collection expenditures in Spanish 
municipalities. 
Therefore, we estimate a model where we use the log of per capita waste recovery as the 
dependent variable and use five dummy variables, one for each year of the term, as 
regressors, while controlling for both provincial- and year-fixed effects. Figure 1 depicts the 
estimated coefficients. The year-in-term indicators capture any fluctuations in the provincial 
attitude towards waste recovery due to the political cycle and vary cross-sectionally by 
province, as provinces are at different points in the electoral cycle. Moreover, given that in 
each year, there are provinces that hold elections and provinces that do not hold elections, it 
is possible to control for common shocks to all provinces (such as changes in macroeconomic 
conditions) by including time dummies. 
Taking one year after the election as the baseline (and thus omitting it from the regression), 
the figure, although descriptive, suggests that the propensity of waste recovery increases as 
elections approach and then decreases just after elections before continuing to rise again. In 
terms of point estimates, it is worth noting that per capita waste recovery reaches its peak 
during the electoral year, when it is found to be approximately 4% higher with respect to the 
year after the election. Taken together, these results corroborate the presence of the political 
budget cycle for Italian provinces. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
The presence of the political budget cycle among Italian provinces allows province attributes, 
X, to be replaced with a variable that induces a continuous exogenous change in the average 
value of the waste recovery of neighbors. Hence, we use five dummy variables, one for each 
year of the term, and then we construct averages for these dummies across neighbors to 
 
9 The approach used here is that of only considering neighbors that are contiguous municipalities as this is a 




instrument for 𝑊𝑅𝑝𝑡. Note that the indicator for one year after an election, 𝑑𝑝𝑡
𝜏+1, and its 
corresponding neighbor value, 𝑊𝑑𝑝𝑡
𝜏+1, are excluded from the estimation to avoid 














𝜏  are four average dummies across neighbors for each 
year of the term indicating neighbors 3 years before an election, neighbors 2 years before an 
election, neighbors 1 year before an election and neighbors during an election year, 
respectively. 
The rationale behind this instrument is that the variation in the neighbors' per capita waste 
recovery can be explained by the position of each neighboring province in its own political 
term, the intuition being that higher levels of waste recovery are likely to occur when 
provinces draw closer to election years. The validity of the instrument is based on the 
assumption that the neighbors’ political cycle is uncorrelated with the error term in Eq. (1). 
While this assumption is not directly testable, we argue that it is likely to hold since the 
instrument is based on the timing of elections of neighboring provinces, which, from the 
province perspective, can be reasonably considered exogenous (Coviello and Gagliarducci, 
2017). After all, it is unlikely that a province deliberately manipulates the timing of its 
elections in view of the waste recovery of its neighbors. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Baseline evidence 
Table A3 of the Online Appendix presents the (first-stage) results based on Equation (2). The 
first column shows the specification without control variables, whereas in Column 2, 
provincial controls are included. The neighbors’ per capita waste recovery is found to be 
larger during the electoral year than during other years of the term. In particular, following 
the Column 1 estimates, the year 3 years after an election is associated with an increase in the 
neighbors’ waste recovery, as the estimated coefficient is positive (0.05) and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the coefficient of neighbors’ expenditures 2 years 
before elections is not statistically significant at the conventional level. One year before the 
election, the cycle seems to begin again. In fact, the coefficient related to neighbors’ 
expenditures one year before an election is positive, although imprecisely estimated, while 
the coefficient associated with the election year is positive (0.05) and statistically significant 
at the 10% level. Regarding the diagnostic test, the Hansen J-test for overidentifying 
restrictions reported at the bottom of the table does not reject the validity of the instruments 
(p-value=0.872). This last evidence, together with the strong statistical significance of the 
instruments, indicates that the instruments are valid. The results are consistent when 
provincial controls are included (Column 2). 
For the second stage (Table 1), central to the issues at hand is the coefficient on neighbors’ 
waste recovery, which is positive (0.79) and statistically significant at the 5% level in the 
specification that does not include control variables (Column 1), and it is very similar (0.76) 
and significant at the 5% level when provincial controls are included (Column 2). 
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These findings obtained by employing a pure, genuinely exogenous instrument point to the 
existence of a positive horizontal interdependence in waste recovery among Italian provinces. 
Specifically, we find that a one percent increase in the average per capita waste recovery of 
neighbors generates, ceteris paribus, an increase of 0.79% in the waste recovery of province 
p. In practice, this reveals that provinces strategically mimic each other in their waste 
recovering practices (Hypothesis 1). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
4.2 Robustness tests 
In this section, we assess the validity of the previous results by performing a set of robustness 
checks. These checks are intended to address possible issues related to the validity of the 
instruments, which could bias the baseline estimates. First, we use a different definition of the 
political budget cycle as an external instrument. After controlling for province and year fixed 
effects, we test for the potential presence of remaining sources of bias by performing 
balancing regressions. Finally, we conduct a battery of falsification tests. 
 
4.2.1 Alternative measures of the political budget cycle as instrumental variables 
Council resignations and/or dismissals among provinces might create concerns about 
identification, as the resignation/dismissal could be endogenous to local area circumstances. 
To account for this, and in the spirit of the test conducted by Repetto (2018) and Ferraresi 
(2020), we construct an artificial political cycle for all provinces by using “predicted” years 
relative to the election, regardless of commissioner status. More precisely, we fix the election 
cycle timing to that at the beginning of the study period, and we assume that each province 
votes again every 5 years. That is, if a province is in its pre-electoral year in 2002, it is 
automatically assumed to vote again in 2008 and thus be in its pre-electoral year in 2007. We 
repeat the same procedure according to the specific year of the term that provinces are in 
during 2001. Using these theoretical schedules, we build the predicted pre-electoral year 
dummy variable and then construct averages for this dummy across neighbors to instrument 
the per capita waste recovery of neighboring municipalities. Column 1 of Table 2 reports the 
results of this analysis and shows that the coefficient is statistically significant and very 
similar to, although slightly larger in magnitude than, those obtained in the baseline 
specification, thus suggesting that endogenous resignation is not a serious concern. 
 
4.2.2 Falsification test 
Another possible concern is related to the timing of the effect. Since the political cycle of 
neighboring provinces at time t impacts per capita waste recovery, which affects the waste 
recovery behavior of a given province at time t, it is very unlikely that the waste recovery 
decisions of neighboring provinces in year t shape a given province’s own waste recovery 
attitude at time t-1. Hence, we conduct a timing falsification test by replacing the dependent 
variable with a one-year lag. The results are shown in Table 2. As seen in Column 2, the 
coefficient of neighbors’ waste recovery at time t does not have any impact on the level of a 
given province’s own waste recovery decisions at time t-1. 
 
 





4.2.3 Balancing test 
While we control for time-invariant unobserved determinants of provincial waste recovering 
capacity in the estimates by including province fixed effects, there still might potentially be 
some remaining sources of bias due to unobserved confounders. The usual way to overcome 
this issue is to add variables as controls on the right-hand side of the regression. Were the 
presence of unobserved effects detected, the coefficient of interest would be sensitive to the 
inclusion of these controls. As the comparison of the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 3 shows, including controls to the baseline specification hardly changes any of the 
results. However, these demographic, institutional and socio-economic variables might be 
poorly measured proxies for the confounders. In this respect, as recently shown by Pei et al. 
(2018), a more suitable test consists of including provincial controls as dependent variables 
on the left-hand side of the regression equation. Table 3 shows the results of these balancing 
regressions for various provincial characteristics, and none of these regressions yields 
significant effects. These results help to rule out the possibility that a correlation between the 
neighboring waste-recovery attitude variable and other time-varying characteristics of 
provinces are driving the results. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
All this evidence seems to indicate that the analyses conducted in this section have helped to 
reinforce the existence of a positive relationship between waste recovery at the provincial 
level and the waste recovery of neighboring provinces. In addition, the results indicate that it 
is very likely that the change in waste recovery is indeed caused by the change in the 
neighbors’ waste-recovery attitudes via the neighboring political cycle, as no other plausible 
explanation that holds as an argument against a causal interpretation of this relationship was 
found. 
 
4.3 Yardstick competition hypothesis and regulatory effects 
The baseline results show the presence of spatial interactions among local government 
decisions on waste recovery. However, there might be several reasons behind this choice, 
and, in particular, one of the most common explanations is based on the yardstick 
competition hypothesis. Politicians might have an incentive to observe what their neighboring 
provinces do to increase (or to not lose) political consensus and thus be re-elected (Salmon, 
1987). Therefore, were this the case, a different behavior would be expected from politicians 
who run for re-election and politicians who do not (Besley and Case, 1995; Bordignon et al., 
2003). To test this assumption, we take advantage of several features of the Italian local 
political system, as well as of other institutional (and exogenous) breaks. 
 
4.3.1 Term limit 
The Italian provincial electoral system establishes a limit of no more than two consecutive 
terms for the office of the president of the province. This feature can be used to investigate 
whether spatial interactions differ according to the status of the president (i.e., first or second 
term in office) and thus test for the yardstick competition hypothesis. Hence, we use the split-
sample idea to divide the sample into two according to presidents in their first or second term. 
Provinces guided by presidents facing a term limit are expected to be less concerned about 
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competing with their neighbors; that is, the neighbors’ recycling coefficient should be less 
marked for provinces governed by second-term presidents. Shown in Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4 – Panel A, the coefficient accounting for spatial interactions in provinces governed 
by first-term presidents is positive (1.02) and statistically significant at the 1% level, while 
the same coefficient turns out to be statistically indistinguishable from zero for the sample of 
provinces led by presidents in their second term of office. Strikingly, what is therefore found 
is that spatial interactions hold only in provinces governed by first-term presidents, which is 
consistent with the yardstick competition hypothesis. 
 
 
4.3.2 Waste Framework Directive 
A key milestone in the European regulation on waste disposal has been established by the 
Waste Framework Directive (Directive 2008/98/EC), which was introduced in 2008; this 
directive provides a general framework of waste management requirements and sets the basic 
waste management definitions for the EU. Hence, the introduction of the directive might have 
generated stronger incentives for Italian provinces to foster positive attitudes towards the 
management of waste recovery. Therefore, spatial interactions should be more pronounced 
after 2008. To test this hypothesis, we follow the same strategy as before, and we divide the 
sample into two periods: one before and one after 2008. 
Shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 – Panel A, the coefficient accounting for spatial 
interactions before the introduction of the Waste Framework Directive (WFD) is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. In contrast, after 2008, the same coefficient is found to be 
positive (0.60) and statistically significant at the 1% level. These findings suggest that the 
need to mimic neighboring expenditure emerged once the Waste Directive was in place, as its 
approval made waste recovery very salient politically. 
 
4.3.3 Term limit and regulatory effects 
However, the transposition of the Waste Directive had the benefit of increasing citizens’ 
awareness of waste recovery, and it also had the drawback of making waste recovery policies 
and their management very politically salient. As a consequence, if politicians compare 
policies carried out in their provinces with those of nearby provinces, we would expect 
yardstick competition to be more pronounced after the approval of the Waste Directive. To 
test for this hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), we divide provinces according to whether the 
president was in his or her first or second term and whether waste management strategies 
were implemented before and after the adoption of the Waste Directive. We then estimate 
Equations (1) and (2) for the four samples. The results of this analysis are reported in Panel B 
of Table 3 and support the prediction that strategic interactions do exist but are limited to 
provinces guided by second-term presidents and in which waste management strategies were 
implemented after the adoption of the directive. Indeed, in Columns 1 and 2, which present 
the results for the sample of provinces before the transposition of the directive, the coefficient 
associated with neighbors’ waste recovery is not statistically significant for either first-term 
presidents or second-term presidents. In contrast, after the adoption of the directive, in the 
group of provinces guided by non-term limited presidents (Column 3), the coefficient of 
neighbors’ waste recovery is positive (0.84) and statistically significant at the 1% level, while 
the same coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from zero for the sample of provinces 
led by presidents in their second term of office (Column 4). These findings suggest that 
electoral motivations guide waste management strategies only when these become very 
salient in the political agenda. 
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5. Conclusion 
The paper has shown that waste management strategies, which are often implemented at the 
local level due to policy decentralization in the natural resources realm, became very salient 
after the approval of the Waste Framework Directive (Directive 2008/98/EC). The directive 
is a policy milestone that pointed towards more ambitious waste management actions as 
pillars of waste prevention and circular economy strategies. In Italy, for example, waste is 
primarily managed at the regional and provincial levels. Regions are responsible for the 
preparation, adoption and updating of waste plans and waste management regulatory 
activities but often delegate periodic control over all waste management, brokerage and trade 
activities to provinces. Therefore, provinces have an important role in determining and 
controlling the amount of waste recovery. We explored the existence of spatial interactions 
between provinces for the management of waste recovery, and we found a statistically 
significant positive effect. We also documented a more marked effect for provinces guided by 
non-lame duck presidents, which is a finding consistent with the yardstick competition 
hypothesis. Interestingly, we have shown that these interactions hold only after the approval 
of the Waste Framework Directive, thus pointing to the key role played by the regulation in 
making waste recovery a salient political issue. Finally, we documented that the incentive for 
presidents to observe what their neighboring provinces do to increase (or to not lose) political 
consensus is effective when presidents can run for re-election, but only after the transposition 
of the waste directive, namely, after waste management policies became politically salient. 
What all of this seems to suggest is that the provinces, in regard to controlling and planning 
waste management policies, act as rent seekers, thereby indicating that a more centralized 
decision-making system, either nationally or regionally centered depending on the 
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Table 1: Waste recovery and spatial interactions – Second stage regressions 
Dependent Variable: Per-capita waste recovery  (log)   
 (1) (2) 
     
Neighbors' waste recovery 0.79** 0.76** 
 (0.36) (0.36) 
1 year before election -0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
2 years before election -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
3 years before election 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Election 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 3.970 4.284 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.872 0.902 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes 
Province Controls No Yes 
Observations 1,428 1,428 
R-squared 0.79 0.81 
Number of Provinces 102 102 
Notes: period 2001-2014. Neighbors' waste recovery is the average value across neighbors’ of the (log) of per capita waste 
recovery. The variable neighbors' waste recovery is instrumented by using the following variables: neighbours’ 1 year before 
election, neighbours’ 2 years before election, neighbours’ 3 years before election, neighbours’ election. Provincial controls 
are: population, employment rate, per capita presence of tourism, per capita GDP, population density and value added. The 
corresponding first stage is reported in Table A3 of the Online Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered at provincial level 

















Table 2: Waste recovery and spatial interactions – Falsification tests (second stage) 
Dependent Variable:  
Per-capita 
 waste recovery  (log) 
Per-capita  
waste recovery  (log)t-1 
 (1) (2) 
    
Neighbors' waste recovery 0.87*** 1.08 
 (0.25) (0.69) 
1 year predicted before election  0.00  
 (0.02)  
2 years predicted before election -0.01  
 (0.02)  
3 years predicted before election 0.01  
 (0.02)  
1 year predicted Election 0.02  
 (0.02)  
1 year before election  -0.04** 
  (0.02) 
2 years before election  -0.02 
  (0.02) 
3 years before election  -0.00 
  (0.02) 
Election  -0.03 
  (0.02) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 4.094 1.291 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.755 0.807 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes 
Province Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 1,428 1,326 
R-squared 0.81 0.76 
Number of Provinces 102 102 
Notes: period 2001-2014. Neighbors' waste recovery is the average value across neighbors’ of the (log) of per capita waste 
recovery. The variable neighbors' waste recovery is instrumented by using the following variables: neighbours’ 1 year before 
election, neighbours’ 2 years before election, neighbours’ 3 years before election, neighbours’ election. The variable 
neighbors' waste recovery in col. (1) is instrumented by using the following variables: neighbours’ 1 year before predicted 
election,  neighbours’ 2 years before predicted election , neighbours’ 3 years before preecited election, neighbours’ predicted 
election. The variable neighbors' waste recovery at time t-1 of column 2 is instrumented by using the following variable: 
neighbours’ 1 year before election, neighbours’ 2 years before election, neighbours’ 3 years before election, neighbours’ 
election. The corresponding first stage is reported in Table A4 of the Online Appendix. Provincial controls are: population, 
employment rate, per capita presence of tourism, per capita GDP, population density and value added. Robust standard 
errors clustered at provincial level are shown in parenthesis. Significance at 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by 







Table 3: Balancing regressions 
Dependent variable Population Employment Tourism GDP Density  Value Added  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
           
Neighbors' waste recovery 0.02 -0.38 -0.01 0.02 -26.09 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.36) (0.18) (0.04) (22.86) (0.03) 
       
Kleibergen-Paap F 4.454 4.402 4.873 4.554 4.464 4.636 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.212 0.447 0.282 0.134 0.855 0.460 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 
R-squared 0.74 0.26 0.57 0.97 0.64 0.96 
Number of Provinces 102 102 102 102 102 102 
Notes: period 2001-2014. Provincial control varibales are population, employment rate, per capita presence of tourism, per capita GDP, 
population density and value added, and exclude the dependent variable. Neighbors' waste recovery is the average value across neighbors’ of 
the (log) of per capita waste recovery. Robust standard errors clustered at the provincial level are shown in parentheses. Significance at 10% 























Table 4: Yardstick competition and regulatory effects – Second stage results 
Panel A No term-limit Term-limit No WFD WFD 
Dependent variable: per-capita waste recovery  (log)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Neighbors'  waste recovery 1.02*** -0.49 0.30 0.60*** 
 (0.39) (1.53) (0.76) (0.21) 
     
Kleibergen-Paap F 2.503 0.24 0.732 7.036 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.740 0.911 0.868 0.733 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,018 407 714 714 
R-squared 0.79 0.61 0.64 0.63 
Number of Provinces 101 82 102 102 
 No WFD  WFD 
Panel B No term-limit Term-limit No term-limit Term-limit 
Dependent variable: per-capita waste recovery  (log)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Neighbors'  waste recovery 0.05 1.13 0.84*** -0.03 
 (0.67) (1.39) (0.25) (0.42) 
     
Kleibergen-Paap F 1.079 0.615 6.200 2.668 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.472 0.736 0.957 0.109 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 457 251 558 138 
R-squared 0.57 0.39 0.67 0.77 
Number of Provinces 101 71 98 33 
Notes: period 2001-2014. Neighbors' waste recovery is the average value across neighbors’ of the (log) of per capita waste 
recovery. The variable neighbors' waste recovery is instrumented by using the following variables: neighbours’ 1 year before 
election,  neighbours’ 2 years before election, neighbours’ 3 years before election, neighbours’ election. Provincial controls 
are: population, employment rate, per capita presence of tourism, per capita GDP, population density and value added. The 
corresponding first stage is reported in Table A5 and A6 of the Online Appendix.Robust standard errors clustered at 
provnical level are shown in parenthesis. Significance at 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at 1% 









Figure 1: Waste recovery and the political budget cycle 
 
 
Notes: This graph is based on the estimates where we use per-capita waste recovery (log) as the dependent variable and four dummy 
variables indicating each year of the electoral term, controlling for province fixed effects and time dummies. Dots represent point estimates 
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Online Appendix  
Table A1: Timing of local elections in Italy 
Year 
# province 
 holding elections 
% provinces  
holding elections on the total 
2001 9 8.74 
2002 10 9.71 
2003 14 13.59 
2004 63 61.17 
2005 6 5.83 
2006 10 9.71 
2007 8 7.77 
2008 19 18.45 
2009 59 57.28 
2010 8 7.77 
2011 11 10.68 
2012 1 0.97 
2013 12 11.65 
2014 10 9.71 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Per-capita waste recovery   1,428 -2.17 0.95 -5.43 -0.77 
Neighbors' waste recovery 1,442 -2.13 0.86 -5.99 -1.08 
1 year before election 1,442 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
2 years before election 1,442 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
3 years before elections 1,442 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Election 1,442 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Neighbors' 1 year before election 1,442 0.20 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Neighbors' 2 years before election 1,442 0.23 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Neighbors' 3 years before elections 1,442 0.23 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Neighbors' election 1,442 0.17 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Population (log) 1,442 12.95 0.71 11.37 15.28 
Employment rate (log) 1,442 -0.95 0.27 -4.29 -0.30 
Per capita tourism (log) 1,442 0.42 1.00 -3.97 3.50 
Per capita GDP (log) 1,442 -3.78 0.36 -5.87 0.00 
Population density 1,442 256.60 360.04 28.88 2,652.58 
Added value 1,442 23.01 0.75 21.21 25.41 
Vote-turnout 1,442 0.72 0.07 0.54 0.83 
Termlimit 1,442 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 






Table A3: Waste recovery and spatial interactions – First stage regressions of Table 1 
 
Dependent Variable: Neighbors' waste recovery     
 (1) (2) 
    
Neighbors 1 year before election 0.04 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Neighbors 2 years before election -0.00 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Neighbors 3 years before election 0.04** 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Neighbors Election 0.05* 0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 3.97 4.284 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.872 0.902 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes 
Province Controls No Yes 
Observations 1,428 1,428 
Number of Provinces 102 102 
Notes: period 2001-2014. Neighbors' waste recovery is the average value across neighbors’ of the (log) of per capita waste 
recovery. Provincial controls are: population, employment rate, per capita presence of tourism, per capita GDP, population 
density and value added. Robust standard errors clustered at provincial level are shown in parenthesis. Significance at 10% 


















Table A4: Waste recovery and spatial interactions – Falsification tests (first stage result of Table 2) 
Dependent Variable: Neighbors' waste recovery   
 (1) (2) 
    
Neighbors 1 year predicted before election 0.13***  
 (0.04)  
Neighbors 2 years predicted before election 0.09**  
 (0.04)  
Neighbors 3 years predicted before election 0.07***  
 (0.03)  
Neighbors Election 0.10***  
 (0.03)  
Neighbors 1 year before election  0.00 
  (0.03) 
Neighbors 2 years before election  -0.03 
  (0.02) 
Neighbors 3 years before election  -0.04 
  (0.03) 
Neighbors Election  0.01 
  (0.02) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 4.094 1.291 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.755 0.807 
Year Effects Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes 
Province Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 1,428 1,326 
Number of provinces 102 102 
Notes: period 2001-2014. Neighbors' waste recovery is the average value across neighbors’ of the (log) of per capita waste 
recovery. The variable neighbors' waste recovery is instrumented by using the following variables: neighbours’ 1 year before 
election, neighbours’ 2 years before election, neighbours’ 3 years before election, neighbours’ election. The variable 
neighbors' waste recovery in col. (1) and (2) is instrumented by using the following variables: neighbours’ 1 year before 
predicted election,  neighbours’ 2 years before predicted election , neighbours’ 3 years before preecited election, neighbours’ 
predicted election. The variable neighbors' waste recovery in col. (3) to (6) is instrumented by using the following variable: 
neighbours’ 1 year before election. Robust standard errors clustered at municipal level are shown in parenthesis neighbours’ 
1 year before election, neighbours’ 2 years before election, neighbours’ 3 years before election, neighbours’ election. 
Provincial controls are: population, employemnt rate, per capita presence of tourism, per capita GDP, poplation density and 
value added. Robust standard errors clustered at provnical level are shown in parenthesis. Significance at 10% level is 









Table A5: Yardstick competition and regulatory effects – First stage results of Table 4 - Panel A 
Dependent variable: Neighbors' waste recovery         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Neighbors 1 year before election 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
Neighbors 2 years before election 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Neighbors 3 years before election 0.07* 0.03 0.03 0.04* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Neighbors Election 0.06* -0.00 0.05 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 2.503 0.24 0.732 7.036 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.740 0.911 0.868 0.733 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,018 407 714 714 
Number of Provinces 101 82 102 102 
Notes: period 2001-2014. Neighbors' waste recovery is the average value across neighbors’ of the (log) of per capita waste 
recovery. The variable neighbors' waste recovery is instrumented by using the following variables: neighbours’ 1 year before 
election, neighbours’ 2 years before election, neighbours’ 3 years before election, neighbours’ election. Provincial controls 
are: population, employemnt rate, per capita presence of tourism, per capita GDP, poplation density and value added. Robust 
standard errors clustered at provincial level are shown in parenthesis. Significance at 10% level is represented by *, at the 
5% level by **, and at 1% level by ***. 
 
Table A6: Yardstick competition and regulatory effects – First stage results of Table 4 - Panel B 
Dependent variable: Neighbors' waste recovery         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Neighbors 1 year before election -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.09* 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
Neighbors 2 years before election -0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.10 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) 
Neighbors 3 years before election 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Neighbors Election 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1.079 0.615 6.2 2.668 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.472 0.736 0.957 0.109 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 457 251 558 138 
Number of Provinces 101 71 98 33 
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